A Progressive State of Mind:  New York\u27s Opportunity To Reclaim Justice For Its Juveniles by Scarpino, Julianne T.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 8
2015
A Progressive State of Mind: New York's
Opportunity To Reclaim Justice For Its Juveniles
Julianne T. Scarpino
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Julianne T. Scarpino, A Progressive State of Mind: New York's Opportunity To Reclaim Justice For Its Juveniles, 23 J. L. & Pol'y (2015).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol23/iss2/8
 845 
A PROGRESSIVE STATE OF MIND: 
   NEW YORK’S OPPORTUNITY TO RECLAIM  
JUSTICE FOR ITS JUVENILES 
  
Julianne T. Scarpino* 
 
 
Though New York State was once progressive in its approach 
to juvenile justice, it is now one of only two states clinging to an 
archaic age of criminal responsibility: sixteen years old. In 
addition, New York’s thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds are 
prosecuted as adults if they commit designated felonies. Adult 
prosecution and incarceration of juveniles harms both the child 
and society. Recent developments in brain imaging demonstrate 
that juveniles are both less culpable than adults and more 
receptive to rehabilitative intervention. In New York, this 
opportunity to rehabilitate is squandered. Juveniles incarcerated 
in adult facilities have limited access to educational and 
rehabilitative programs and are at high risk for sexual 
victimization, depression, and criminal socialization. Moreover, 
empirical studies of juveniles sentenced as adults conclude that 
adult sentencing has no deterrent effect on juvenile crime. 
Proposed legislation, the youth court pilot program, and 
recommendations from the Governor’s Commission are 
progressive steps to dismantling New York’s outdated juvenile 
justice system, but they fall short by denying assistance to New 
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York’s most troubled juveniles. This Note advocates four changes 
to the New York criminal justice system. First, the age of criminal 
responsibility in New York should be raised to eighteen. Second, 
New York should establish a separate youth court to adjudicate all 
cases involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and all 
designated felonies committed by thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-
year-olds. Third, New York should eliminate any provisions 
permitting the transfer of juveniles from family court to adult 
criminal court. Fourth, district attorneys and judges should have 
discretion to authorize waiver from criminal court to youth court 
for select cases involving eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds. It is 
time for New York to raise the age of criminal responsibility and 






“There is no denying the fact that we cannot write 
these children off forever.  Some day they will grow 
up and at some point they will have to be freed from 
incarceration . . . and the kind of society we have in 
the years to come will in no small measure depend 
upon our treatment of them now.”1 
 
Rikers Island is situated in the middle of the East River—out of 
sight, mind, and earshot of most New Yorkers.2 Though its inmates 
are generally unseen and unheard, former teen inmate Ismael 
Nazario can confirm that the juveniles incarcerated at Rikers and 
the screams they bellow from their cells are quite real.3 Rikers is a 
                                                
1 Rose M. Charles & Jennifer V. Zuccarelli, Note, Serving No “Purpose”: 
The Double-Edged Sword of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 12 ST. JOHN’S 
J. LEGAL COMM. 721, 743 (1997) (quoting United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 
1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting)). 
2 See Culture of Violence Pervades Rikers’ Juvenile Facilities (National 
Public Radio Oct. 15, 2014), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=356165968. 
3 Amelia Pang, This is New York: Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco, Director of 
Juvenile Justice Project on Protecting Children, EPOCH TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014), 
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city jail for adult inmates, and the majority of its prisoners are kept 
there pending the resolution of their cases.4 In New York, 
however, the term “adult” can be misleading. New York is one of 
only two states5 that automatically prosecute sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds as adults, and adult criminal court retains 
original jurisdiction over juveniles as young as thirteen who 
commit designated felony acts.6  
At age sixteen, Ismael was arrested for assault and incarcerated 
at Rikers pending the resolution of his criminal case.7 Most often, 
the source of Ismael’s and his fellow inmates’ agony was their 
time in solitary confinement8—a form of isolated imprisonment 
where the inmate spends twenty-three hours per day in a six-by-
eight foot cell and one hour per day in a cage outdoors.9 While 
incarcerated, Ismael spent more than 300 days in solitary 
confinement.10 Ismael, reflecting on his time at Rikers, recalled the 
screams of fellow inmates and the times he lent his voice to their 
                                                
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/923273-this-is-new-york-gabrielle-horowitz-
prisco-director-of-juvenile-justice-project-on-protecting-children/print.php. 
4 See Trey Bundy, For Teens at Rikers Island Solitary Confinement Pushes 
Mental Limits, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://cironline.org/reports/teens-rikers-island-solitary-confinement-pushes-
mental-limits-6130. 
5 North Carolina is the only other state that automatically prosecutes 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults. Michael A. Corriero, Judging 
Children as Children: Reclaiming New York’s Progressive Tradition, 56 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2012). 
6 See Charles & Zuccarelli, supra note 1, at 739; Stephen A. Newman, 
Foreword: The Past, Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice Reform in New 
York State, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2012); Get the Facts, RAISE THE 
AGE NY, http://raisetheageny.com/get-the-facts (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). A 
designated felony act is defined as “an act which, if done by an adult, would be a 
crime.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 301.2(8) (McKinney 2014). A non-exhaustive 
list of these acts includes murder, kidnapping, arson, rape, and assault. Id. 
7 Bundy, supra note 4; Culture of Violence Pervades Rikers’ Juvenile 
Facilities, supra note 2. 
8 Bundy, supra note 4. 
9 Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers to Ban Isolation for Inmates 
21 and Younger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
01/14/nyregion/new-york-city-to-end-solitary-confinement-for-inmates-21-and-
under-at-rikers.html?_r=0. 
10 Bundy, supra note 4. 
848 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
communal cry.11 According to Ismael, teenagers desperate to avoid 
solitary confinement engaged in potentially life-threatening 
conduct, such as placing “AA batteries in their rectums.”12 This, 
and any other act considered suicidal, resulted in temporary 
ineligibility for solitary confinement.13 Although solitary 
confinement was an agonizing form of punishment for Ismael and 
similarly situated juveniles at Rikers, this form of abuse was but 
one of a myriad of issues for juveniles incarcerated at adult 
facilities.14 
After years of criticism, in 2014 the New York City 
Department of Correction eliminated the use of solitary 
confinement for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old inmates.15 
Though these juveniles are no longer subjected to the rigors of 
solitary confinement, youth advocates argue that this change masks 
the true problem: “New York’s adult criminal justice system, 
including every county jail and adult correctional facility, is no 
place for children and youths.”16 
Proponents of raising New York’s age of criminal 
responsibility argue that the prosecution of juveniles as adults has 
crippled a segment of the juvenile population and produced 
disastrous results for both the offenders and society as a whole.17 
New York prosecutes annually approximately 40,000–50,000 




14 See generally Tamar Birckhead, Op-Ed., The Solitary Confinement of 
Youth, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH. (Sep. 23, 2014), http://jjie.org/op-ed-the-
solitary-confinement-of-youth/. While incarcerated at Rikers, Ismael was 
“attacked by four inmates who demanded his phone privileges and food 
commissary and required him to ask their permission before sitting in a chair or 
using a bathroom.” Id. 
15 Winerip & Schwirtz, supra note 9. On January 10, 2015, the New York 
City Board of Corrections approved a plan to eliminate solitary confinement for 
all inmates twenty-one years old and younger. Id. The policy change would take 
effect in 2016, but is contingent on funding. Id. 
16 Jennifer March, Letter to the Editor, Keeping Youths Out of Adult 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
08/07/opinion/keeping-youths-out-of-adult-prisons.html. 
17 See, e.g., Get the Facts, supra note 6. 
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sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults.18 Juveniles incarcerated 
in adult facilities are “five times more likely to be sexually 
assaulted”19 and “thirty-six times more likely to commit suicide” 
than juveniles in juvenile detention facilities.20 While juvenile 
detention facilities offer rehabilitative and educational programs to 
support detainees, adult facilities have limited access to age-
appropriate mental health, physical health, and educational 
services for the juveniles incarcerated there.21 In addition, unlike 
family court adjudication for juveniles, criminal court adjudication 
affords no automatic sealing provision.22 If processed in criminal 
court, designation as a Youthful Offender is a juvenile’s only 
opportunity for a sealed record.23 Should these juveniles emerge 
from adult incarceration and attempt to become productive 
members of society, the stigma of a criminal record creates 
significant barriers to education, employment, and housing.24 
                                                
18 WARREN A. REICH ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE TO 16- AND 17-YEAR-OLD DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK 2 
(June 2014), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/ 
documents/ADP%20Y2%20Report%20Final%20_v2.pdf. 
19 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4) (2003). 
20 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF 
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (November 2007) 
[hereinafter JAILING JUVENILES], available at http://www.campaignfor 
youthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf. 
21 Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining 
Juveniles with Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1454 
(2012). 
22 Lisa Schreibersdorf, Bringing the Best of Both Worlds: 
Recommendations for Criminal Justice Reform for Older Adolescents, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2014); FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S 
COMMISSION ON YOUTH, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND JUSTICE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2015) [hereinafter 
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM], 
available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/ 
files/ReportofCommissiononYouthPublicSafetyandJustice_0.pdf. 
23 GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, 
supra note 22, at 3. 
24 Corriero, supra note 5, at 1419–22. This Note does not suggest that 
juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities face no barriers to education, 
employment, or housing post-incarceration. Rather, this Note argues that those 
barriers are heightened by adult incarceration. 
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that juveniles are 
constitutionally distinct from adults for sentencing purposes 
because of their immaturity, recklessness, and impulsivity.25 
Moreover, developments in brain imaging demonstrate that brain 
development continues into adulthood.26 Juvenile brains are more 
active than adult brains in regions controlling aggression and fear, 
and less active than adult brains in regions associated with risk 
assessment and impulse control.27 This research suggests that 
juveniles are not only less culpable than adults, but more receptive 
to rehabilitative intervention.28 Though juveniles are physically, 
psychologically, and constitutionally different from adults, New 
York’s criminal justice system fails to account for these 
differences. As a result, New York’s children suffer.  
To rectify New York’s treatment of young offenders, this Note 
argues for four changes to the New York criminal justice system. 
First, the age of criminal responsibility in New York should be 
raised to eighteen. Second, New York should establish a separate 
youth court to adjudicate all cases involving sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds, and all designated felonies committed by 
thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds. Third, New York should 
eliminate any provisions permitting the transfer of juveniles from 
family court to adult criminal court. Finally, district attorneys and 
judges should have discretion to authorize waiver from criminal 
court to youth court for select cases involving eighteen- to twenty-
one-year-olds. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief history 
of the juvenile justice system in New York and the evolution of 
New York’s juvenile offender laws. Part II analyzes and compares 
New York’s juvenile and adult criminal systems. Part III examines 
scientific research regarding juvenile brain development and the 
negative consequences of prosecuting juveniles as adults, and 
concludes that raising the age of criminal responsibility in New 
                                                
25 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
26 Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-
633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *12 [hereinafter AMA Brief]. 
27 Id. 
28 See Get the Facts, supra note 6. 
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York will better serve youth offenders and the community. Part IV 
examines and critiques current proposals for augmenting New 
York’s juvenile justice system.  Part V puts forth the alternative 
recommendations to both laws and procedures described above. 
This Note does not suggest that juveniles should not be held 
accountable for their actions.  Rather, it proposes investing 
resources in rehabilitative and deterrent measures designed 
specifically for youth offenders. New York prosecutes and 
incarcerates juveniles at a time in their lives when they are most 
susceptible to rehabilitative intervention. Under the current 
paradigm, the State misses the precious opportunity to turn 
troubled teens into productive members of society.   
 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK STATE’S 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
New York’s juvenile justice system has evolved significantly 
from its nineteenth century origins.29 Once a leader in 
rehabilitative justice,30 New York exchanged its progressive 
policies for punishment-based reform.31 The efficacy of these 
reforms is now called into question, as brain imaging and 
sociological research suggests that New York’s retributive system 
is failing its juveniles.32 
 
A. Rehabilitative Origins 
 
Though New York’s early juvenile justice system often fell 
short of its rehabilitative aims,33 its founding principles have 
reemerged in contemporary juvenile justice reform 
                                                
29 See Alison Marie Grinnell, Note & Comment, Searching for a Solution: 
The Future of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
635, 666–67 (2000). 
30 Jellisa Joseph, Note, Catching Up: How the Youth Court Act Can Save 
New York State’s Outdated Juvenile Justice System with Regard to Sixteen and 
Seventeen-Year-Old Offenders, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 219, 222 (2014). 
31 See Grinnell, supra note 29, at 667. 
32 See Get the Facts, supra note 6. 
33 See Grinnell, supra note 29, at 639. 
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recommendations.34 “[T]he reform and rehabilitation of New York 
children who have engaged in criminal activity—and their 
segregation from adult transgressors—dates from the early 
nineteenth century.”35 In 1824, New York State formed the New 
York House of Refuge to offer juveniles rehabilitative treatment 
outside of the adult incarceration system.36 New York founded the 
House of Refuge on the premise that juveniles required specialized 
treatment and could be rehabilitated through discipline and 
education.37 This emphasis on juvenile rehabilitation was 
progressive; the facility was the first juvenile reformatory in the 
nation.38 Though the House of Refuge was “[p]artly modeled upon 
the then new adult penitentiary system, children, unlike adults, 
received indeterminate sentences, which could remain in effect 
until age twenty-one.”39 By 1846, male offenders under age 
eighteen and female offenders under age seventeen were precluded 
from adult incarceration. Thus, at its early stages, New York’s 
juvenile justice reform “prohibited the imprisonment of sixteen and 
seventeen year old children, an achievement which has eluded this 
state throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.”40 The 
New York House of Refuge operated for 110 years, closing in 
1935 when the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile 
Delinquents in New York City dissolved.41  
                                                
34 See Katharine Lazarow, Note, The Continued Viability of New York’s 
Juvenile Offender Act in Light of Recent National Developments, 57 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 595, 616 (2013). 
35 Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 
PACE L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2010) [hereinafter Sobie, Pity the Child]. 
36 Jordan K. Hummel, Note, The Bitter Side of Sweet Sixteen: Why New 
York Should Amend Its Juvenile Transfer Laws, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 
261, 269 (2014). 
37 Joseph, supra note 30. Despite its rehabilitative premise, the New York 
House of Refuge received criticism for its use of retributive measures, such as 
physical abuse and solitary confinement. Grinnell, supra note 29, at 639. 
38 Joseph, supra note 30. 
39 Merril Sobie, Family Court–A Short History, 1 Jud. Notice 6 (2011) 
[hereinafter Sobie, Family Court], available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/ 
lawfaculty/858/. 
40 Sobie, Pity the Child, supra note 35, at 1067. 
41 The Greatest Reform School in the World: A Guide to the Records of the 
New York House of Refuge, N.Y. State Archives 6 (1989), available at 
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In 1902, New York County created a specialized juvenile 
court, tasked with adjudicating juvenile cases for offenders under 
age sixteen.42 This court was a division of the adult criminal court 
system and utilized the same judicial proceedings.43 The New York 
State Legislature decriminalized most juvenile offenses in 1909.44 
When the legislature realized that juveniles required further 
distinct treatment from adults, New York created an independent 
juvenile court—the New York State Children’s Court—in 1922.45 
Juveniles younger than sixteen “were within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Children’s Court.”46 The Children’s Court’s 
jurisdiction excluded juveniles charged with capital offenses or 
offenses punishable by life imprisonment, as well as all juveniles 
over fifteen.47 The Children’s Court’s low jurisdictional age limit 
garnered criticism almost immediately—criticism that has 
continued for close to a century.48 Despite numerous legislative 
attempts to raise the age of criminal responsibility,49 the New York 
State Legislature has consistently “tabled the issue for future 
review.”50 
In establishing the Children’s Court, “[s]aving the child had 
become the paramount consideration—the underlying conduct, 
criminal or non-criminal . . . was viewed merely as symptomatic or 
as one consideration in formulating a rehabilitative prescription.”51 
                                                
http://www.archives.nysed.gov/a/research/res_topics_ed_reform.pdf. 
42 Grinnell, supra note 29, at 639. 
43 Id. 
44 GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, 
supra note 22, at 3. 
45 Merril Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on the 
Juvenile Justice System, 26 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 677, 682 (1981).  
46 Grinnell, supra note 29, at 640. 
47 Id. 
48 Hummel, supra note 36, at 270. 
49 These legislative attempts include the 1942 Joint Legislative Committee 
on Children’s Court Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency, the 1961 New York 
Constitutional Convention, the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, the 2012 New 
York Senate Bill 7394, and the 2012 New York Senate Bill 7020. Hummel, 
supra note 36, at 270; Joseph, supra note 30, at 238–39. 
50 Hummel, supra note 36, at 270; Joseph, supra note 30, at 238–39. 
51 MERRIL SOBIE, THE CREATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF NEW 
YORK’S CHILDREN’S LAWS 176 (1987). 
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The court assumed a parens patriae role.52 Judges were given wide 
discretion to impose indeterminate sentences that could remain in 
effect until the juvenile reached the age of majority.53 In electing to 
separate juvenile and adult criminal offenders, “juvenile courts 
rejected both the criminal law’s jurisprudence and its procedural 
safeguards.”54 For example, the Children’s Court initially utilized 
both jury trials and the reasonable doubt standard for determining 
delinquency.55  However, as early as the 1930s the court relaxed 
these procedural safeguards, deeming them unnecessary in light of 
the aim to treat rather than punish the child.56 The right to an 
attorney,57 jury trials, and the right against self-incrimination were 
thus eliminated.58 
The 1961 New York State Constitutional Convention dissolved 
the Children’s Court and reorganized the juvenile court system.59 
The 1962 Family Court Act replaced the Children’s Court.60 The 
Family Court Act “created a uniform court system, granting 
jurisdiction to family courts to handle cases involving ‘every 
symptom of familial dysfunction,’ including, but not limited to 
child neglect, juvenile delinquency, intra-family violence, and 
paternity suits.”61 The Family Court Act “incorporated several 
landmark provisions” and procedural safeguards that the 
Children’s Court lacked: children were assigned counsel, permitted 
to conduct discovery, introduce evidence, and appeal adverse 
                                                
52 Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to 
Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 192 (1998). Parens patriae, Latin for 
“parent of his or her country,” refers to the state’s capacity to protect those 
unable to care for themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (10th ed. 2014). 
53 Feld, supra note 52, at 193. 
54 Id. at 192. 
55 Grinnell, supra note 29, at 640. 
56 Id. at 640–41. 
57 Feld, supra note 52, at 192. 
58 Grinnell, supra note 29, at 640–41. 
59 GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, 
supra note 22, at 4. 
60 Id. 
61 Ashley A. Hughes, The Evolution of Youth as an Excuse: Striking a 
Balance Between the Interest of Public Safety and the Principle That Kids Are 
Kids, 29 TOURO L. REV. 967, 994 (2013). 
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decisions.62 Additional family court protections included the 
potential for complete disposition of a case following probation, no 
mandatory sentencing requirements, and sealed juvenile records.63 
Family court retained exclusive jurisdiction over children at least 
seven years old and less than sixteen years old, unless the child 
was fifteen years or older and charged with an offense punishable 
by death or life imprisonment.64 However, under the 1962 Family 
Court Act, a criminal court judge could waive into family court a 
juvenile who was fifteen years old or older if he had been charged 
with a capital or life-imprisonment offense.65 
 
B. Retributive Juvenile Justice Reform 
 
Though the Children’s Court and the 1962 Family Court Act 
laid a rehabilitative foundation for New York’s juvenile justice 
system,66 increases in juvenile crime during the 1970s67 sparked a 
wave of retributive reform.68 Media outlets and politicians 
sensationalized the surge in violence, attributing it to various 
factors, including the crack epidemic, gang violence, and gun 
accessibility.69 Reacting to mounting public pressure for more 
stringent juvenile punishments,70 the New York State Legislature 
adopted the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976.71 The 1976 Act 
                                                
62 Sobie, Family Court, supra note 39, at 7. 
63 Hughes, supra note 61, at 995. 
64 Grinnell, supra note 29, at 641. 
65 Id. 
66 See Hughes, supra note 61, at 994. 
67 See Lazarow, supra note 34, at 596 n.2. 
68 See GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 
REFORM, supra note 22, at 4–5. 
69 Lazarow, supra note 34, at 602. 
70 “Media hype surrounding isolated incidents of excessive juvenile 
violence and predictions of a coming wave of super-predators and fledgling 
psychopaths hastened this philosophical shift by arousing public alarm and 
serving as the platform for politicians to compete to demonstrate that they aimed 
to get tough on crime.” Michael J. Ritter, Just (Juvenile Justice) Jargon: An 
Argument for Terminological Uniformity Between the Juvenile and Criminal 
Justice Systems, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 228–29 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 
71 Michelle Haddad, Note, Catching Up: The Need for New York State To 
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amended the purpose of the Family Court Act to balance the needs 
of juveniles against the consideration for community safety.72 
The inclusion of a community interest provision in the Family 
Court Act’s purpose signaled “a sharp philosophical change from 
the concept of individualized justice based solely on the needs and 
interests of the child.”73 In furtherance of protecting community 
interests, the 1976 Juvenile Justice Reform Act created a “new 
category of delinquency”—“designated felony”—for certain 
violent crimes, including robbery and homicide.74 Children ages 
fourteen and fifteen charged with the commission of a designated 
felony were eligible for harsher punishments, such as restrictive 
confinement for three to five years.75 Though the 1976 Act 
provided for harsher penalties, its overall tenor remained rooted in 
juvenile treatment and rehabilitation.76 The 1976 Act was 
unexpectedly short lived—a mere two years later the 
sensationalized crimes of one New York juvenile would precipitate 
sweeping juvenile justice reform.77 
In March of 1978, a fifteen-year-old New York boy committed 
a series of violent crimes that ignited a “national wave in favor of 
mandating transfer to adult criminal court for violent young 
offenders.”78 On a subway approaching Yankee Stadium, fifteen-
year-old Willie Bosket79 shot a sleeping man twice in the head.80 
                                                
Amend Its Juvenile Offender Law To Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and 
Normative National Trends Over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 455, 458 (2009). 
72 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2014) (“In any proceeding 
under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of the 
respondent as well as the need for protection of the community.”). 
73 SOBIE, supra note 51, at 169. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Haddad, supra note 71, at 459–60. 
77 See id. at 457–60; GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE 
JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 22, at 5. 
78 Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of 
the Role of Transfer To Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 371, 383 (1998). 
79  
An interesting and disturbing fact of Willie Bosket’s life 
history is that he had, for a bulk of his childhood, been the 
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Bosket removed a ring and a watch from the man’s hand, fifteen 
dollars from the man’s pocket, and then left the scene of the 
crime.81 Less than one week later, Bosket shot and killed a second 
subway passenger and injured a train yard dispatcher.82 The 
murders and subsequent trial were highly publicized,83 and the 
media referred to Bosket as “the Baby-Faced Butcher.”84 Due to 
Bosket’s age, his case was adjudicated in a Bronx family court, 
where he was found guilty of both murders.85 In accordance with 
the 1976 Juvenile Justice Reform Act, Bosket received the 
maximum penalty for his crimes: five years of incarceration at a 
juvenile facility, with no permanent criminal record.86 
Unsurprisingly, the resulting public outcry for “tough on 
crime” legislation was heeded in that gubernatorial election year.87 
                                                
victim of severe physical and sexual abuse and spent a great 
deal of time in the custody of New York’s juvenile justice 
system for committing minor crimes.  Despite having been 
confined to their care, almost every opportunity to rehabilitate 
him and address his needs was missed. 
Travis Johnson, All Children Are Created Equal Too: The Disparate Treatment 
of Youth Rights in America, 15 CUNY L. REV. 173, 182 (2011). 




84 Klein, supra note 78, at 383–84. 
85 Haddad, supra note 71, at 456. 
86 Johnson, supra note 79, at 182. Just three months after his release from 
the juvenile facility, Bosket was arrested for attempted robbery and assault. 
Haddad, supra note 71, at 456 n.4. During his incarceration Bosket earned two 
more convictions, resulting in a sentence of twenty-five years to life 
imprisonment. Id. While serving this sentence, Bosket stabbed a prison guard in 
the chest, resulting in a conviction for attempted murder. Id. Between 1985 and 
1994, Bosket received more than 250 disciplinary violations. John Eligon, Two 
Decades in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/09/23/nyregion/23inmate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. In 1994, Bosket 
was relegated to solitary confinement, and is eligible to rejoin the general prison 
population in 2046. Id. 
87 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 182; Michael A. Corriero, with Alison M. 
Hamanjian, Advancing Juvenile Justice Reform in New York A Proposed Model, 
80 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 21 (2008) (“In 1978, an extraordinary case of juvenile 
violence, a gubernatorial election and public frustration with the juvenile justice 
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Just two weeks after Bosket’s sentencing, New York Governor 
Hugh Carey opened a special legislative session,88 which 
evidenced “the legislature’s outraged state of mind and thirst for 
retribution.”89 A few months later, the New York State Legislature 
adopted the 1978 Juvenile Offender Act, which remains in effect 
today.90 
The 1978 Act lowered the age of criminality from sixteen to 
thirteen for the most serious violent offenses.91 The New York 
State Legislature vested criminal court, as opposed to family court, 
with original jurisdiction over thirteen-year-olds charged with 
second degree murder or a sexually motivated felony, and 
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds charged with second degree 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, arson, assault, rape, criminal 
sexual act, aggravated sexual abuse, burglary, robbery, possession 
of a firearm on school grounds, attempted murder, attempted 
kidnapping, or a sexually motivated felony.92 The 1978 Act 
designated the term Juvenile Offender to describe these thirteen-, 
fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds.93  
Under the 1978 Act, Juvenile Offenders are treated as adults at 
arrest and prosecuted in criminal court.94 Waiver of Juvenile 
Offenders to family court is possible, but occurs only at the 
discretion of the district attorney or judge.95 Under New York 
Penal law, the sentencing ranges for Juvenile Offenders in criminal 
court occupy the middle of a spectrum—available sentence ranges 
are “less severe than for adults but more severe than those 
                                                
system resulted in enactment of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law.”). 
88 Lazarow, supra note 34, at 603. 
89 Haddad, supra note 71, at 464. Notably, after approving the 1976 
Juvenile Reform Act, Governor Carey publicly discussed his support of the 
Legislature’s decision to rehabilitate juvenile offenders outside of the adult 
criminal justice system. Id. at 463. 
90 Id. at 457. 
91 Hummel, supra note 36, at 271–72; Grinnell, supra note 29, at 643. 
92 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18) (McKinney 2014); Charles & Zuccarelli, 
supra note 1, at 739–40.  
93 GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, 
supra note 22, at 5. 
94 Id. 
95 Hummel, supra note 36, at 272. 
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available for juveniles convicted of [designated felony acts] in 
Family Court.”96 
The 1978 Juvenile Offender Act not only lowered the age of 
criminal responsibility, but increased mandatory sentences for 
violent offenders, required mandatory incarceration for certain 
violent crimes, and restricted the plea bargaining process for all 
violent offenders.97 Under the 1978 Act, if a juvenile is prosecuted 
in criminal court, his only means of avoiding a permanent felony 
record is designation as a “Youthful Offender.”98 Youthful 
Offender treatment seals all related records,99 but may be granted 
via judicial discretion only in limited circumstances.100 Moreover, 
even though a grant of Youthful Offender status may seal a 
juvenile’s record, he is still required to navigate the adult 
adversarial court system, where retributive sanctions take 
precedent over rehabilitative ones.101 
New York State was not alone in adopting tough-on-juvenile-
crime policies. “Anxious to establish their crime control 
credentials, politicians across the country turned untested ideas 
into guiding principles and promulgated criminal and juvenile 
justice policies without any attention to whether the promised 
                                                
96 GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, 
supra note 22, at 5. 
97 Haddad, supra note 71, at 460. 
98 Id. at 462. 
99 Hummel, supra note 36, at 272. 
100 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 2014). Adolescents 
accused of murder, armed felonies, or sex crimes are ineligible for Youthful 
Offender Status, unless  
[T]he court determines that one or more of the following 
factors exist: (i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly 
upon the manner in which the crime was committed; or (ii) 
where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, 
the defendant’s participation was relatively minor although not 
so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.  
Id. In determining whether to grant Youthful Offender status, the court balances 
“the nature of the offense, whether the victim suffered any physical injuries, the 
defendant’s role in the offense, the defendant’s prior criminal history, as well as 
the recommendations of both the prosecutor and defense counsel.” Grinnell, 
supra note 29, at 647–48. 
101 Haddad, supra note 71, at 462. 
860 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
outcomes would ever occur.”102 Between 1970 and 1990, forty 
jurisdictions reduced the minimum age for criminal prosecutions, 
twelve states eliminated the minimum age requirement for the 
transfer of juveniles into adult criminal court, and Congress 
expanded the number of federal crimes with which a juvenile could 
be charged.103 Though tough-on-juvenile-crime reforms swept the 
nation,104 New York retains the lowest age of criminal 
responsibility, joined only by North Carolina.105 
 
II. COMPARING THE ADULT AND JUVENILE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS IN NEW YORK 
 
Rehabilitation, deterrence, and in extreme cases, incapacitation, 
serve as the philosophical foundations of New York’s juvenile 
justice system.106 The adult criminal justice system varies by 
degree—it is less rehabilitative and more punitive than the juvenile 
system, exemplified by harsher sentences, fewer educational 
opportunities for incarcerated persons, and harsher incarceration 
conditions.107   
Family court has original jurisdiction over Persons In Need Of 
Supervision (PINS) and Juvenile Delinquents.108 The term PINS 
denotes a status offender younger than eighteen who is processed 
for non-criminal behavior.109 The term Juvenile Delinquent 
denotes a child from seven to fifteen years old who commits an 
offense that would be criminal if the child were over age fifteen.110 
Criminal court, as opposed to family court, has original jurisdiction 
                                                
102 Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of 
Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 156 (2014). 
103 Id. at 157. 
104 Id. 
105 See Corriero, supra note 5, at 1415. 
106 Ellie D. Shefi, Note, Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles 
in Adult Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 653, 654 (2003).  
107 See Charles & Zuccarelli, supra note 1, at 728–30. 
108 See GOV’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 
REFORM, supra note 22, at 10, 15. 
109 Id. at 10. 
110 Id. 
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over Juvenile Offenders—juveniles aged thirteen to fifteen who 
commit designated felony offenses.111 Criminal court also has 
original jurisdiction over all adults—persons sixteen years and 
older who commit a criminal offense or violation.112  
A defendant’s designation—as a PINS, Juvenile Delinquent, 
Juvenile Offender, or Adult—affects jurisdiction, which in turn 
affects adjustment opportunities, detention facilities, confinement 
facilities, and whether the defendant retains a criminal record.113 A 
juvenile processed through the family court system may benefit 
from “adjustment”—diversion of the juvenile’s case from the 
prosecutor’s office to the Department of Probation.114 First, the 
juvenile and his parental guardian meet with a probation officer to 
determine if the juvenile’s case is eligible.115 If all parties select 
adjustment as an appropriate measure, the juvenile may participate 
in rehabilitative programs in lieu of prosecution.116 According to 
recent studies, thirty-eight percent or more of cases processed in 
family court are selected for adjustment.117 
The Department of Probation considers a number of factors in 
making an adjustment determination, including the gravity of the 
offense and the juvenile’s likelihood of re-offending.118 If a 
juvenile’s case is not selected for adjustment, it is referred to a 
specialized juvenile prosecutor.119 The prosecutorial process 
includes a “mandatory investigation by the probation department 
into the academic, emotional, social, and familial background” of 
the juvenile.120 Both the prosecutor and the court utilize this 
information to determine the appropriate punishment or remedial 
measure for the juvenile.121 In accordance with the Family Court 
Act, disposition of a juvenile’s case requires the court to “order the 




114 Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1146. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1146–47. 
117 Id. at 1147. 
118 Id. at 1146 n.12. 
119 Id. at 1146. 
120 Id. at 1147. 
121 Id. 
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least restrictive” means deemed “consistent with the needs and best 
interests of the respondent and the need for protection of the 
community.”122 This sentencing requirement affords the court wide 
latitude to consider the best interests of the child and community, 
in light of a holistic assessment of both the juvenile and his 
offense. 
The sealing provision is arguably the most advantageous 
benefit of family court adjudication.123 Juvenile proceedings in 
family court are sealed, which ensures that as a juvenile transitions 
into adulthood, his educational, employment, and housing 
opportunities are not stunted by youth offenses.124 In contrast, 
criminal court adjudication of sixteen-year-olds, seventeen-year-
olds, and Juvenile Offenders affords no automatic sealing 
provision.125 For these juveniles, designation as a Youthful 
Offender is the only opportunity for a sealed record.126 As 
discussed in Part I, Youthful Offender status “provides the 
opportunity for any youth under the age of 19 to have a criminal 
conviction substituted with a noncriminal adjudication at 
sentencing.”127 Youthful Offender status is mandatory for juveniles 
under age nineteen who are convicted of a misdemeanor with no 
prior convictions or Youthful Offender determinations.128 
Otherwise, a Youthful Offender determination is discretionary.129 
Moreover, juveniles convicted of Class A felonies are prohibited 
from Youthful Offender status.130 In New York, approximately 
“1,600 juveniles per year are saddled with criminal records that 
create[] barriers to success for the rest of their lives.”131 
                                                
122 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2 (McKinney 2014). 
123 Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1148. 
124 Id. 
125 GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, 





130 Id. at 134 n.536. 
131 Andrew M. Cuomo, Opportunity Agenda: 2015 State of the State 279 
(2015), available at 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/2015_Opp
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PINS and Juvenile Delinquents processed in family court are 
detained pre-trial and confined post-trial in a juvenile facility132 
that often resembles a group home.133 A Juvenile Offender 
processed in criminal court is detained pre-trial in a secure youth 
facility and confined post-trial in an Office of Children and Family 
Services (OCFS) secure center. Juveniles age sixteen and older are 
detained pre-trial and confined post-trial in adult correctional 
facilities—either county jails or prisons.134 Juvenile and adult 
correctional facilities differ in numerous ways, including services 
and population.135 Adult prisons employ approximately one teacher 
for every one hundred inmates and one security staff member for 
every four inmates.136 Juvenile facilities employ one teacher per 
every fifteen residents and one custodial or monitoring staff 
member per every eleven residents.137 In terms of counseling, adult 
prisons employ one medical staff member for every twenty-five 
inmates—with the term medical staff describing a broad category 
of medical and technical staff that includes counselors.  Two-thirds 
of juvenile facilities employ one counselor for every ten 
residents.138  
In adult facilities, inmates generally have greater size and 
strength, more extensive criminal histories, and more experience 
with incarceration than juveniles housed in juvenile facilities.139 
While approximately fifty-three percent of adult prison inmates in 
                                                
ortunity_Agenda_Book.pdf. 
132 New York’s juvenile detention facilities have received harsh criticism 
for “intolerable conditions.” See Newman, supra note 6, at 1264 (“The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigated four New York juvenile detention 
facilities and issued a report in August 2009 finding that juveniles held in 
confinement were regularly being abused, severely injured, and deprived of 
constitutional rights.”). 
133 See GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 
REFORM, supra note 22, at 10; Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1148. 
134 See GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 
REFORM, supra note 22, at 10; Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1148. 
135 Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice 
System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 139–40 (2000). 
136 Id. at 140. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 139. 
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state facilities are violent offenders,140 approximately thirty-three 
percent of juveniles in juvenile detention facilities are violent 
offenders.141 In summary, juveniles incarcerated in adult 
correctional facilities have less access to education and health 
programs and are exposed to older, stronger, more violent, and 
more seasoned offenders. 
 
III. RAISING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NEW 
YORK 
 
 During the past fifteen years, the scientific community has 
developed a wealth of research demonstrating that juveniles have 
both reduced culpability for criminal conduct and greater capacity 
for rehabilitation.142 This capacity for positive change is 
squandered when juveniles are prosecuted as adults. Juveniles 
prosecuted as adults retain a criminal record, which can cripple 
their education, employment, and housing opportunities.143 
Juveniles incarcerated with adults are at heightened risk for 
emotional abuse, sexual abuse, and criminal socialization.144 
Moreover, juveniles incarcerated with adults have limited access to 
educational and rehabilitative programs, which further hinders 
successful societal reintegration post-incarceration.145 Empirical 
studies of juveniles sentenced as adults conclude that adult 
sentencing has no deterrent effect on juvenile crime and in fact 
increases recidivism.146 Taken in sum, prosecuting juveniles as 
                                                
140 The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections 4 
(2011), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_ 
in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf.  
141 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, Facts: Youth in the Justice System 2 
(last updated April 2012), available at http://www.campaignfor 
youthjustice.org/documents/KeyYouthCrimeFacts.pdf. 
142 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 158–59. 
143 Corriero, supra note 5, at 1419. 
144 See Wood, supra note 21, at 1450–51; JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 
20, at 4. 
145 See Wood, supra note 21, at 1454. 
146 See Robert Anthonsen, Note, Furthering the Goal of Juvenile 
Rehabilitation, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 729, 741 (2010) (discussing two 
studies that concluded that the adult prosecution of juveniles in New York and 
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adults benefits neither the juvenile nor the community.  
A. Scientific Research Regarding Juvenile Brain 
Function 
 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the last ten years reflect the 
Court’s understanding that “adolescents are unfinished products, 
developmentally and morally” and “that these factors hold 
constitutional significance.”147 The Court has invalidated, on 
Eighth Amendment grounds, the following sentences for juveniles: 
capital punishment for those less than eighteen years of age,148 life 
sentence without parole for non-homicide convictions,149 and 
mandatory life sentences for those convicted of homicide.150 In 
reaching these decisions, the Court focused on “three significant 
gaps between children and adults” that reduce the juvenile’s 
culpability, including the juvenile’s (1) underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, which leads to impulsive and reckless decisions, (2) 
inability to remove himself from negative influences and 
vulnerability to such negative influences and pressures, and (3) 
underdeveloped moral character, which indicates that his actions 
do not necessarily exemplify permanent depravity.151 The Court 
supported its conclusions, in part, with scientific research 
regarding juvenile brain structure and social science research 
regarding juvenile behavior.152   
Scientific studies of the brain regions associated with 
emotional impulses and impulse control conclude that adolescent 
brains are more active than adult brains in regions controlling 
aggression and fear, and less active than adult brains in areas 
controlling risk assessment and impulse control regions.153 This 
                                                
Idaho produced no deterrent effect on juvenile crimes rates and two studies that 
concluded that New York and Florida juveniles prosecuted as adults are more 
likely to reoffend). 
147 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 146 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012)). 
148 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
149 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010). 
150 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
151 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Hummel, supra note 36, at 278. 
152 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 163. 
153 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *12.  
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research demonstrates that juveniles are less culpable than adults 
for their actions. 
It is impossible to understand the differences between juvenile 
and adult criminal responsibility without first examining key 
scientific aspects of the brain. The limbic system serves as the 
brain’s emotional center,154 within which sits the neural system 
known as the amygdala.155 The amygdala is often associated with 
aggressive and impulsive behavior, as it has evolved to produce 
fight or flight responses to danger.156 The frontal lobes, by 
contrast, are associated with emotional regulation and response 
inhibition.157 More specifically, “complex information-processing 
functions such as perception, thinking, and reasoning”158 occur in 
the neocortex and “the prefrontal cortex is associated with . . . 
decision making, risk assessment, ability to judge future 
consequences, evaluating reward and punishment, behavioral 
inhibition, impulse control, deception, responses to positive and 
negative feedback, and making moral judgment.”159 Recent 
developments in brain imaging demonstrate that adolescents have 
highly active limbic systems and less active frontal lobes.160 As 
adolescents mature, brain activity gradually shifts from the 
amygdala to the frontal lobes.161 Thus, until critical brain 
development is complete, the impulse-controlling frontal lobe 
                                                
154 Id. at *12 (citing Daniel J. Siegel, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A 
NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE, 10 (Guilford Press 1999)).  
155 Id. 
156 Id. at *12–13 (citing Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 
38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (1999)). 
157 Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain 
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 
(1999). 
158 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *13–14 (quoting DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE 
DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL 
EXPERIENCE, 10 (Guilford Press 1999)). 
159 Id. at *13–14. 
160 Id. at *15. 
161 Id. (citing K. Rubia et al., Functional Frotalisation with Age: Mapping 
Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with fMRI, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAV. 
REVS. 13 (2000)). 
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“exerts less control” over the amygdala.162 Neurological research 
suggests that this critical brain development continues until the 
early twenties.163 Behavioral scientists have long described 
juveniles as emotionally volatile, impulsive, and poor evaluators of 
risk assessment.164 Brain imaging technology now accounts for 
these traits and the juvenile’s ability to outgrow them, which 
demonstrates that juveniles are less culpable than adults for their 
criminal actions.165  
Brain imaging has also confirmed that adolescent brains are 
structurally underdeveloped in regions relating to reasoning and 
impulse control.166 The prefrontal cortex remains structurally 
immature throughout adolescence, because both myelination and 
pruning are incomplete.167 Myelin, a fatty white substance, 
insulates neural fibers that use electrical impulses to relay 
information.168 “The presence of myelin makes communications 
between different parts of the brain faster and more reliable” and 
the development of myelin continues throughout adolescence.169 
The presence of myelin is a sign of brain maturity and myelination 
in the frontal cortex—the risk assessment and impulse control 
center—continues until late adolescence.170  Neuroscience research 
                                                
162 Id.  
163 Anthonsen, supra note 146, at 744 (citing KEN C. WINTERS, MENTOR 
FOUNDATION, ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND DRUG ABUSE 4 
(2008)). 
164 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *11. 
165 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 189–90 (“So, as neurological 
and behavioral science demonstrates, a typical fourteen-year-old will have an 
underdeveloped sense of self and underdeveloped cognitive and emotional 
controls that will lead her to submit to peer pressure and engage in thrill-
seeking, often criminal conduct. But those actions, no matter how dangerous, do 
not indicate that she is either irretrievably depraved or fundamentally flawed.  
She, fortunately, will continue to develop and will mature out of offending.”). 
166 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *16. 
167 Id. at *17. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at *16 (quoting ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: 
FRONTAL LOBES & THE CIVILIZED MIND 144 (2001). 
170 See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the 
Human Life Span, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 309, 311–12 (2003) (using high 
resolution structural MRI to study gray matter density in individuals ages seven 
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suggests that immature myelination contributes to adolescent 
immaturity, and that the increased white matter in adult brains 
affords the “cognitive complexity” that facilitates impulse 
control.171 
Pruning, like myelination, is crucial to brain maturity and also 
occurs late into adolescence.172 Pruning is a process by which gray 
matter—brain cells responsible for frontal lobe tasks—is 
decreased.173 Pruning both establishes and extinguishes neural 
pathways, improving the overall functioning of the frontal lobes.174 
Thus, “[o]ne of the last areas of the brain to reach full maturing, as 
measured by pruning, is the part associated with regulating 
behavior, stifling impulses, assessing risks, and moral 
reasoning.”175 This research holds profound significance for 
adolescents’ responsibility for their actions, even when such 
actions are criminal. To expect juveniles to demonstrate the 
judgment or impulse control of adults is to expect them “to 
transcend their own psychological [and] biological capacities.”176 
 
B. Harms of Treating Adolescent Offenders as Adults 
 
In light of the scientific research demonstrating juvenile 
capacity for rehabilitation, the adult prosecution and incarceration 
of New York’s juveniles is all the more tragic. Juveniles 
incarcerated with adults are at increased risk for sexual abuse, 
depression, and criminal socialization,177 and have limited access 
                                                
to eighty-seven and finding, among other things, that “the trajectory of 
maturational and aging effects varied considerably over the cortex,” with 
myelination continuing into adulthood in the frontal neocortices). 
171 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 187. 
172 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *19. See also Winters, supra note 163, at 
4 (explaining that pruning is essential “for more efficient and faster information-
processing” and that the areas of the brain associated with “reasoning and 
judgment are developing well into the early to mid 20s”). 
173 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *19. 
174 Id. See also Winters, supra note 163, at 4. 
175 AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *20.  
176 Id. 
177 Wood, supra note 21, at 1450–51; JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 
4.  
 A PROGRESSIVE STATE OF MIND 869 
to age-appropriate mental health, physical health, and educational 
services.178 In addition, juveniles prosecuted as adults retain a 
criminal record, which can cripple their education, employment, 
and housing opportunities.179 As a result of these impediments to 
reintegration, adolescents processed in criminal court continue 
cycling through the criminal justice system.180  
 
1. Harms Suffered by Juveniles in Adult Prisons and 
Jails 
 
Juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are at high risk for 
sexual victimization.181 Juveniles who are underdeveloped 
“physically, cognitively, socially, or emotionally, are less capable 
of protecting themselves from sexual advances and assault.”182 
Sexual abuse often begins within forty-eight hours of a juvenile’s 
incarceration in an adult facility.183 Juveniles in adult facilities “are 
five times more likely to be sexually assaulted” than their 
counterparts in juvenile detention centers.184 In 2005, though 
juveniles accounted for less than one percent of the jail population, 
they were victims in twenty-one percent of substantiated inmate-
on-inmate sexual violence.185 
Sexual abuse and rape have emotional and psychological 
consequences, such as depression and posttraumatic stress 
disorder.186 “Juveniles who have been sexually abused may face 
problems with anger, impulse control, flashbacks, dissociative 
episodes, hopelessness, despair, and persistent distrust and 
withdrawal.”187 In addition, sexual assault and rape exposes 
                                                
178 Wood, supra note 21, at 1454. 
179 Corriero, supra note 5, at 1415. 
180 See Roxanna Asgarian, The Two Sides of Raise the Age in New York, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (July 7, 2014), http://jjie.org/the-
two-sides-of-raise-the-age-in-new-york/. 
181 JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4. 
182 Wood, supra note 21, at 1453. 
183 Id. at 1450–51. 
184 Id. at 1451. 
185 JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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victims to sexually transmitted infections, such as HIV/AIDS and 
hepatitis.188  In the United States, HIV and AIDS rates are five 
times higher among the prison population.189 
To protect teens from adult inmates, prison staff often resort to 
housing teens in solitary confinement.190 Though this measure 
eliminates the physical and emotional harms that result from teen 
contact with adult inmates, prolonged isolation merely substitutes 
one harm for another. “Even limited exposure to [solitary 
confinement] can cause anxiety, paranoia, exacerbate existing 
mental disorders, and increase risk of suicide.”191 Juveniles 
incarcerated in adult jails are thirty-six times more likely to 
commit suicide than juveniles in a juvenile detention facility.192  
Teens incarcerated with adults are also susceptible to criminal 
socialization, by which they develop familiarity and comfort with 
criminal behavior and networks.193 To assimilate into inmate 
culture and mask their vulnerability, incarcerated teens may 
engage in violent behavior.194 Juveniles incarcerated in adult 
facilities are “more likely to learn social rules and norms that 
legitimate[] domination, exploitation, and retaliation.”195 
Incarceration with adult offenders facilitates a criminal education, 
where teens learn techniques for performing criminal acts and 
avoiding detection.196 As a result, this socialization can transform a 
juvenile into a career criminal.197 Given the scientific research 
demonstrating juvenile malleability and capacity for positive 
growth,198 the criminal socialization of juveniles is all the more 
tragic.   
                                                
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Wood, supra note 21, at 1450. 
194 Id. at 1451, 1456. 
195 Joseph, supra note 30, at 230 (quoting Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, 
Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
237, 263 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin Zimring eds., 2000)). 
196 Wood, supra note 21, at 1455–56. 
197 See id. 
198 Get the Facts, supra note 6. 
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While juvenile detention facilities offer rehabilitative and 
educational programs to support detainees, adult facilities have 
limited access to age-appropriate mental health, physical health, 
and educational services.199 Adult facilities, which are not designed 
for juvenile care, “may fail to provide juveniles with the 
appropriate nutrition or dental and vision care, which are especially 
critical for developing adolescents.”200 In addition, most 
incarcerated juveniles have not completed their high school 
education, and imprisonment in an adult facility limits their ability 
to do so.201 A Bureau of Justice Assistance survey found that forty 
percent of adult jails provided no education services and only 
eleven percent provided special education services.202 In contrast, 
the Department of Justice’s 2010 Juvenile Residential Facility 
Census reported that ninety-two percent of juvenile facilities 
offered educational services to some or all residents.203 
 
2. Adult Sentencing of Juveniles Neither Reduces 
Juvenile Crime Rates Nor Prevents Recidivism 
 
Studies assessing the deterrent effect of prosecuting juveniles 
as adults conclude that the threat of adult sanctions has no 
deterrent effect on juvenile crime.204  One study assessed the effect 
of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law on juvenile crime rates by 
analyzing the number of juvenile arrests that occurred during the 
four years preceding the legislation and six years subsequent to 
it.205 The researchers compared New York juvenile crime rates to 
the rates of two control groups, which included Philadelphia youth 
                                                
199 Wood, supra note 21, at 1454–55. 
200 Id. at 1455. 
201 Id. at 1454–55. 
202 JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4. 
203 SARAH HOCKENBERRY ET AL., JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY 
CENSUS, 2010: SELECTED FINDINGS, NATIONAL REPORT SERIES 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/241134.pdf. 
204 See Anthonsen, supra note 146, at 741–42. 
205 Id. at 741 (discussing Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, 
Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile 
Offender Law, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 521, 521–35 (1998)). 
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offenders and older New York offenders.206 They concluded “that 
the threat or use of adult criminal sentencing had no effect on the 
levels of serious juvenile crime.”207 A second study, evaluating the 
deterrent effect of Idaho’s 1981 juvenile transfer statute, reached 
the same conclusion.208 Researchers compared juvenile arrest rates 
during the five years preceding the legislation and five years 
subsequent to it, concluding the legislation had no deterrent effect 
on juvenile crime.209 
A third study assessed the effect of New York’s Juvenile 
Offender Law on juvenile recidivism.210 The study analyzed the 
recidivism rates of 800 fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds.211 The 
sample set included 400 juvenile robbery offenders and 400 
juvenile burglary offenders, selected from two New Jersey 
counties and two New York counties.212 In accordance with the 
New York Juvenile Offender Law, the New York juvenile cases 
originated in criminal court.213 In contrast, the New Jersey juvenile 
cases originated in the juvenile justice system, with the option for 
waiver to adult criminal court.214 The study concluded that both 
conviction rates and sanction severity were higher for juveniles in 
the criminal court system.215 For burglary offenders, court 
jurisdiction did not affect the recidivism rate.216 For robbery, 
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208 Id. at 741 (discussing Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the 
Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & 
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however, offenders processed in criminal court had re-arrest rates 
fifty percent higher than offenders processed in juvenile court.217 
This increased recidivism rate suggests that public safety was 
compromised, rather than promoted, by the criminal court 
adjudication of juveniles.218 The outcomes of these studies suggest 
that charging New York’s juveniles as adults does not reduce 
recidivism and thus the “subjection of the youthful criminal to ‘just 
desserts’ is merely a placebo for the public’s fear.”219 
 
3. Adult Sentencing Inhibits Successful Reintegration 
Into Society 
 
Adolescents prosecuted as adults retain a criminal record, 
which can cripple their education, employment, and housing 
opportunities.220 As a result of these impediments to reintegration, 
adolescents processed in criminal court continue “cycling back 
through the [criminal justice] system.”221  
As discussed in Parts II and III, juveniles incarcerated in adult 
facilities face educational barriers, which hinder their ability to 
complete high school or obtain a GED.222 After incarceration, only 
one-third of young adults in New York complete their education.223 
Without a high school diploma, these juveniles are more likely to 
be unemployed and require public assistance.224 For those 
juveniles who complete high school, opportunities for higher 
education are diminished due to their criminal history.225 
According to a recent survey, “66% percent of the responding 
colleges collect criminal justice information.”226 Juveniles 
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convicted as adults maintain a criminal record, and thus are 
required to disclose their criminal history to interested colleges.227 
In addition, college financing for these juveniles is almost 
impossible given that prospective students with a criminal 
conviction have limited access to federal student aid loans.228 
Juveniles with criminal records also face impediments to 
securing both private and public housing. In New York, property 
owners may decline an application due to the applicant’s criminal 
record.229 Moreover, the New York City Housing Authority 
screens all applicants over sixteen for a criminal record—a policy 
that gravely impacts a youth offender’s family.230 “The family is 
deemed ineligible for public housing for prescribed periods of time 
after the convicted person has served his/her sentence,” which 
includes probation, parole, and/or payment of a fine.231 The period 
of ineligibility is determined based upon the severity of the 
underlying offense.232 A person convicted of a Class B 
misdemeanor is ineligible for public housing for three years after 
completing probation or parole.233 This three-year housing sanction 
for misdemeanor offenders is comparatively severe, considering 
the maximum sentence of imprisonment for any misdemeanor is 
only one year.234 A person convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony 
is ineligible for public housing for six years.235 
In addition to the physical barriers noted above, juveniles who 
are sentenced as adults may suffer psychological consequences that 
delay their reintegration post-incarceration. Research has identified 
“desistance from crime with adult maturation,” which juveniles 
                                                
THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 
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234 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2014).  
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achieve in part by “engaging in age-appropriate behavior.”236 In 
essence, in order to grow-out of their criminal activity, juveniles 
need the opportunity to grow-up with their age cohort.237 Juveniles 
sentenced as adults experience disrupted education and 
employment.238 Thus, “juveniles punished as adults are behind 
their age cohort in meeting the adulthood markers of marriage, 
full-time employment, school completion, and independent 
residency.”239 
 
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO NEW YORK’S JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
 
A. Youth Court Pilot Program and Senate Bill 7394 
 
In 2012, New York Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman instituted a 
youth court pilot program, which created “nine adolescent 
diversion parts” across New York State, and “promote[s] non-
criminal dispositions for 16- and 17-year-olds, including social 
service interventions and community service, which could earn a 
dismissal of charges.”240 Instituting this program required no 
legislative action, instead building upon youth diversion programs 
already established in certain local courts.241  
Non-violent sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders are 
eligible for participation in the pilot program.242 First, teens are 
scheduled to meet with a probation officer for an adjustment 
eligibility evaluation.243 During this evaluation, the probation 
officer establishes conditions for adjustment, such as restitution 
and/or participation in a community service program.244 If the teen 
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complies with the mandated conditions, criminal charges will not 
be filed.245 If, however, the teen fails to meet the mandated 
requirements, he will appear before a judge trained in adolescent 
behavior.246   
Where adjustment is either not offered or is unsuccessful, the 
juvenile’s case proceeds to arraignment and adjudication.247 
Benefits of the youth court include additional rights not available 
in family court, such as bail and trial by jury.248 Once a verdict is 
reached, the youth court judge has discretion “to craft the ‘least 
restrictive’ available disposition consistent with the ‘needs and best 
interests’ of the youth[] and the ‘need for protection of the 
community’—a more lenient standard than that for adults under 
the Penal Law.”249 
Though the youth court pilot program is a progressive step in 
dismantling New York’s outdated juvenile justice system, the 
protection it affords extends only to juveniles accused of non-
violent crimes.250 Therefore, juveniles who commit violent crimes 
and are arguably most in need of youth court’s rehabilitative 
opportunities are unable to reap its benefits. Children are 
unfinished products, capable of positive change—“the immaturity 
and plasticity that create an increased propensity for wrongdoing in 
adolescents also provide an enormous capacity for learning, 
development, and growth.”251 A juvenile’s offense, no matter how 
egregious, does not limit this capacity for growth. Given juvenile 
malleability, they deserve every opportunity for rehabilitation.   
The youth court pilot program serves as a “testing ground” for 
Judge Lippman’s legislative proposal and provides a mechanism 
for immediately addressing the juvenile justice system’s defects 
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247 Jeff Storey, Judge Would Wear Two Hats in Proposed Youth Court, 
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 2, 2012, at 2. 
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until new legislation is approved.252 New York State Senator Steve 
Saland presented Judge Lippman’s legislative proposal to the New 
York State Legislature as Senate Bill 7394 (2012).253 In addition to 
creating the youth court pilot program, the bill proposed changes to 
the Criminal Procedure Law, the Penal Law, the Executive Law, 
and the Judiciary Law.254 It proposed revising the Criminal 
Procedure Law to include a section devoted to sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-old offenders.255 This section required a myriad of 
procedural safeguards, such as parental notification at arrest, 
release of the adolescent offender into a guardian’s custody, and 
prohibition against releasing the adolescent’s fingerprints to a 
federal depository.256 In addition to amending the Criminal 
Procedure Law, Senate Bill 7394 revised Penal Law section 30.00 
by raising the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen years 
old.257 
Senate Bill 7394 was referred to the Codes Committee of the 
New York State Senate, after which the bill failed to progress 
further.258 The Bill was reintroduced in the 2013 session as Senate 
Bill 4489 and again was referred to the Codes Committee.259 At 
this time, no further movement has occurred.260 Though there is no 
definitive explanation for the failure of these bills to progress,261 
counties and various state departments expressed concern over 
increased costs.262 
 
B. Senate Bill 7020 
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In a separate attempt to raise the age of criminality in New 
York, Senator Velmanette Montgomery introduced Senate Bill 
7020 during the 2012 session.263 Senate Bill 7020 proposed raising 
the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen years old, permitting 
juvenile detention centers to house all adolescents under eighteen, 
and raising the maximum age for Youthful Offender Status from 
nineteen to twenty years old.264 
One important feature of Senate Bill 7020 is that it made no 
distinction between violent and non-violent juveniles.265 Senate 
Bill 7020 authorized family court to adjudicate violent felony cases 
involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.266 Though criminal 
court retained original jurisdiction over juveniles charged with 
designated felonies, the court could remove these cases to family 
court without authorization by the district attorney.267 Senate Bills 
7020 and 7394 ultimately faced the same fate—referral to the 
Codes Committee where all progress ceased.268 Senate Bill 7020 
was re-introduced in the 2013 legislative session as Senate Bill 
1409, where it was again referred to the Codes Committee.269 
 
C.  Governor’s Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and 
Justice’s Proposal 
 
On April 9, 2014, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 
131 establishing the Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and 
Justice.270 The Commission was tasked to “(a) develop a plan to 
raise the age of juvenile jurisdiction, and (b) make [a] 
recommendation as to how New York’s justice system can 
improve outcomes for youth while promoting community 
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safety.”271 On January 19, 2015, the Commission released its 
comprehensive 163-page report.272 A non-exhaustive list of the 
report’s topics includes: the evolution of juvenile reform in New 
York State; best practices in juvenile justice; the upper and lower 
ages of delinquency jurisdiction across the United States; recent 
reforms raising the age of criminal responsibility in other states; 
arrest and diversion processes; court processes for sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds and younger offenders; pretrial and post-trial 
confinement of juveniles; harms of incarcerating juveniles in adult 
facilities; juvenile disposition services and facilities; juvenile re-
entry post-incarceration; the consequences for juveniles with a 
criminal record; and the projected impact on case processing if 
New York were to raise the age of the criminal responsibility.273  
In addition to summarizing and analyzing juvenile justice 
processes, the report puts forth thirty-eight procedural and 
legislative recommendations for reform.274 Consistent with the 
proposals discussed above, the report recommends raising the age 
of juvenile jurisdiction to eighteen.275 The report recommends 
raising the lower threshold of juvenile jurisdiction to age twelve, 
excluding homicide offenses.276 The recommended lower age 
threshold for juvenile homicide offenders is ten years old.277 The 
report also recommends expanding family court jurisdiction to 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with non-violent 
felonies, disorderly conduct violations, misdemeanors, and 
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harassment.278 Under this scheme, the criminal court system would 
retain original jurisdiction over “current Juvenile Offender crimes, 
as well as all violent felony offenses; all homicide offenses; Class 
A felonies; crimes of terrorism; felony vehicular assaults; 
aggravated criminal contempt; and conspiracy to commit any of 
these offenses and tampering with a witness related to any of these 
offenses.”279 
The report also recommends creating youth parts within the 
criminal court system.280 However, unlike Judge Lippman’s youth 
court proposal, these youth parts would have jurisdiction over all 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, as well as younger 
offenders designated as Juvenile Offenders.281 Given that this 
proposal mandates family court adjudication for certain sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-old offenders and criminal court adjudication 
for other sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, the specially 
trained youth part judges would be vested with concurrent criminal 
court and family court jurisdiction.282 In addition, the Commission 
recommends extending Youthful Offender status to nineteen and 
twenty-year-olds (currently Youthful Offender eligibility is limited 
to juveniles under nineteen years old).283 Finally, regardless of 
family court or criminal court jurisdiction, the proposed reform 
prohibits confinement of any juvenile in an adult jail or prison and 
permits juveniles to remain in youth facilities until age twenty-
one.284 This particular recommendation is extremely progressive, 
and reflects the documentation of the harms suffered by juveniles 
in adult facilities. 
The Commission’s reforms are arguably the most progressive 
in the nation, extending family court protections to a larger age 
cohort and a more expansive list of offenses.285 Following the 
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report’s release, New York State Bar President Glenn Lau-Kee 
voiced the association’s support for raising the age of criminal 
responsibility: 
Every child accused of a nonviolent felony deserves 
a second chance . . . . Research demonstrates—what 
parents intuitively know—that 16 and 17-year-old 
kids lack the maturity and judgment to understand 
the legal consequences of their actions. A criminal 
record at a young age can shadow a lifetime, 
affecting an individual’s future education and 
employment. Raising the age of criminal 
responsibility will help all children to embark on a 
more positive path to adulthood. Providing troubled 
teenagers with support and guidance can help them 
turn around their lives.286  
Lau-Kee’s statement echoes the underlying tenor of the 
Commission’s recommendations, and contains the same 
contradiction as well. Lau-Kee states that juveniles lack judgment 
to appreciate the legal consequences of their actions and discusses 
how the burden of a criminal record prevents juveniles from 
breaking the criminal mold.287 In making these particular 
statements, Lee-Kau includes no qualifiers—he speaks of all 
children.288  Yet, when he discusses which juveniles should benefit 
from the proposed reforms, he limits his scope to children accused 
of nonviolent felonies.289 While the proposed reforms are a critical 
step toward providing juveniles access to crucial rehabilitative 
opportunities and assisting juveniles in successful re-entry post-
incarceration,290 juveniles who commit the most egregious of 
offenses are denied access to these benefits.  
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This Note’s proposal is comprised of four parts.291 First, the 
age of criminality in New York should be raised from sixteen to 
eighteen years old. Second, New York should establish a separate 
youth court to adjudicate all cases involving sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds, and all designated felonies committed by 
thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds. Third, New York should 
eliminate any provisions permitting the transfer of juveniles from 
family court to adult criminal court. Finally, district attorneys 
should have discretion to permit reverse waiver from criminal 
court to youth court for select cases involving eighteen- to twenty-
one-year-olds. 
First, the New York State Legislature should amend the Family 
Court Act to increase the age of criminal responsibility from 
sixteen to eighteen years old.292 Research demonstrates that the 
adolescent brain is underdeveloped, which limits adolescent 
capacity for decision making, impulse control, and reasoning. This 
research suggests that adolescent offenders are less culpable than 
their adult counterparts, and that their youth should therefore be 
considered in the adjudication process. In addition, this research 
                                                
291 For the purpose of this Note, I do not take into account the potential 
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demonstrates that adolescent brains are still developing and thus 
are receptive to rehabilitative interventions. Raising the age of 
criminal responsibility is the first step in reclaiming New York’s 
lost youth. 
Second, within the family court system, the New York State 
Legislature should designate a separate youth court tasked with 
adjudicating offenses committed by (1) all sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds, and (2) all thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-old 
designated felony offenders. Family court provisions—including 
adjustment, sealing, and sentencing that considers both the best 
interests of the child and the community—would be extended to 
youth court. This youth court would have jurisdiction over these 
cohorts, regardless of offense severity. Though sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds are juveniles, their cognitive abilities are 
generally more developed than younger offenders, making their 
criminal culpability less than adults’ but greater than younger 
offenders’.293 These juveniles should be prosecuted in a court 
designed to recognize their education, psychological maturity, 
mental health, and family life. In addition, this youth court would 
have original jurisdiction over thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-
year-olds who commit designated felony acts. Youth court is the 
appropriate venue for these young offenders because of its more 
stringent sentencing capabilities, discussed below, and greater 
familiarity with violent offenses. 
Youth court sentencing guidelines should include more 
stringent measures than those available to family court judges.294 
This would account for the increased age of offenders and the 
increased severity of offenses. Youth court judges would 
appropriately consider the adolescents’ mental development and 
culpability in determining the sentence. In addition, any sentence 
requiring incapacitation would be served in a secure juvenile 
facility rather than an adult prison. If a juvenile is sentenced to a 
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underdeveloped cognitive abilities of younger adolescents, such as fourteen- and 
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prison term that extends beyond his twenty-first birthday, the 
remainder of his sentence would be served in an adult facility.  
Though family court is not the appropriate venue for these 
adolescent offenders, neither is adult criminal court. Youth court’s 
ability to impose strict sentences would assuage “public critique 
that juvenile courts are too lenient”295 while ensuring that 
adolescents are adjudicated in a court developed specifically for 
their age group. 
Third, the New York State Legislature should eliminate 
transfer from family court to criminal court, in order to ensure that 
family court or youth court retains jurisdiction over all juveniles.296 
Both family court and youth court conduct a holistic assessment of 
the youth and his offense, and then determine the least restrictive 
disposition available consistent with society’s needs and the 
offender’s needs.297 Criminal court does not have this discretion. 
As a result of criminal court adjudication, adolescents are 
incarcerated in adult facilities with limited access to age-
appropriate mental health, physical health, and educational 
services.298 Adolescents in adult facilities are at greater risk for 
sexual victimization and suicide.299 After their incarceration, these 
adolescent offenders face significant barriers to education, 
employment, and housing.300 Moreover, research suggests that 
adult sanctions neither deter youth offenders nor decrease 
recidivism.301 For these reasons, the New York State Legislature 
should eliminate transfer provisions from family court to criminal 
court. 
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Fourth, the legislature should permit waiver to youth court for 
select eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds.302 Scientific research 
suggests that brain development continues until at least age 
twenty-four.303 Unavoidably, the age delineation in youth court’s 
original jurisdiction is somewhat arbitrary—a person does not 
wake up on his eighteenth birthday endowed with significantly 
more knowledge, impulse control, and reasoning than he had the 
day prior. Further, raising the age of criminality to eighteen is in 
accordance with best practice across the United States.304 
However, given the robust scientific research finding limitations in 
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds’ impulse control and reasoning 
skills, a district attorney or judge should have discretion to suggest 
removal in appropriate cases. The district attorney would likely 
utilize this discretion if the offender only recently turned eighteen 
or if the offender exhibited developmental delays suggesting his 




Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco, Director of the Juvenile Justice 
Project at the Corrections Association, stresses that “no one is 
solely the worst thing they have ever done.”305 Though one person 
may not be solely his worst act, New York’s paradigm entrenches 
the state’s youngest offenders in a correctional system designed to 
ensure that their first worst act is not their last. Sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds face an uphill battle to overcome their juvenile 
offenses. 
Juvenile brains are underdeveloped in regions associated with 
risk assessment, impulse control, and reasoning, and these regions 
continue to mature into early adulthood.306 This research 
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demonstrates that juveniles are both less culpable than adults and 
more receptive to rehabilitative intervention.307 Juveniles should be 
processed in a court that accounts for their diminished culpability 
and capitalizes on their potential for positive growth. Moreover, 
juvenile capacity for rehabilitation is squandered by juvenile 
incarceration in adult facilities. Juveniles incarcerated in adult 
prisons and jails have limited access to educational and 
rehabilitative programs,308 and are at high risk for sexual 
victimization, emotional abuse, depression, and criminal 
socialization.309 In addition, the adult prosecution of juveniles has 
no deterrent effect on juvenile crime rates and juveniles prosecuted 
as adults are more likely to re-offend than juveniles prosecuted in 
family court.310 This re-offending rate is unsurprising, given that a 
criminal record severely limits one’s housing, education, and 
employment opportunities.311 
Proposed legislation, the youth court pilot program, and 
recommendations from the Governor’s Commission are 
progressive steps toward dismantling New York’s outdated 
juvenile justice system, but they fall short by denying assistance to 
New York’s most troubled juveniles. New York is prosecuting and 
incarcerating juveniles at a time in their lives when they are most 
responsive to rehabilitative intervention, and losing a precious 
opportunity to turn troubled teens into productive members of 
society. It is time for New York to raise the age of criminal 
responsibility and embrace rehabilitative intervention for all youth, 
regardless of the offense. Investing in New York’s juveniles is an 
investment in the future. Sixteen is too young, and our resources 
too vast, to concede hopelessness just yet.  
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